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A large body of empirical literature has established the existence of a strong 
relationship between financial development and economic growth, showing that 1) 
countries with more developed financial sectors typically grow faster, and 2) financial 
development helps improve the allocation of capital (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; 
Levine, 2005). While much of the focus has been on the importance of financial 
development for economic growth, some recent studies have started to address how 
finance can have an effect on income inequality. For instance, Rajan and Ramcharan 
(2011) argue that financial development can be hold back not only in countries with weak 
political institutions, but also where democracies are well developed. In particular, 
powerful interest groups can restrict the access to credit and make it costlier. Similarly, 
Haber and Perotti (2007) attribute to democratic corporatism, oligopolistic capture and 
state opportunism as the main political constraints on the development of financial system. 
In the same vein, Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010) highlight that financial regulation has 
been typically led by private interests of wealthy incumbents in the form of rents from 
others. These have, in turn, outweighed the public interests in protecting the poor. Rajan 
(2010) highlights that the stagnant incomes of the middle class have built pressure on 
politicians to expand credit and to make housing more affordable. While helping to 
maintain the path of consumption, the fact that household incomes did not respond in the 
same manner has ultimately led to the financial crisis, a conclusion that is shared by 
Hubbard (2010), who looks at the linkages between income inequality, household debt 
leverage and financial crises. Agnello and Sousa (2012a) show that banking crises 
substantially raise income inequality, widening the income inequality gap before the event 
emerges and sharply reducing it afterwards. Besides, fiscal austerity can also increase 
inequality particularly when it is driven by spending cuts rather than tax hikes.1 
Financial reforms can therefore influence the distribution of income, as rising 
inequality generally reflects an unequal access to productive opportunities. First, financial 
reforms can improve the efficiency of the domestic financial systems (Abiad and Mody, 
2005). Second, they can lead to a better allocation of risk and socialization of costs, which 
is particularly relevant during financial crises (Claessens and Perotti, 2007). Third, they 
FDQ KDYH D ³TXDOLW\ HIIHFW´ RQ DOORFDWLYH HIILFLHQF\ E\ HTXDOL]LQg access to credit and 
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 Agnello and Sousa (2012b) find that fiscal adjustments are more prone towards reducing inequality when 
they succeed in achieving long-term public debt sustainability. However, Agnello and Sousa (2012c) also 
emphasize that income inequality tends to rise significantly both during periods of fiscal consolidation and in 
the aftermath of such adjustments. 
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reducing variation in expected marginal returns (Abiad et al., 2008). These outcomes, in 
turn, can help mitigate income inequality.   
In this article, we show that financial reforms help reduce income inequality. 
Removal of policies towards directed credit and elimination of high reserve requirements 
seem to be particularly effective in bringing inequality down at the low-end of the income 
distribution. Similarly, policies that improve the functioning of the equity markets and ease 
the openness of securities markets to foreign investors can help guarantee equal 
opportunities for low- and middle-income households. 
 
2. Econometric Methodology 
We start by considering a baseline model that does not take into account the impact 
of financial reforms on income inequality. More specifically, we estimate the following 
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where I is the average of the net income Gini inequality index over 5-year non-overlapping 
windows, y denotes the per capita income (in levels and squared terms), g is the 
government size and T is the degree of openness. All control variables are observed at the 
beginning of each time window. Finally, ig  indicates the individual effects. 








jitii,...},){jjj,ti(t +iD)+(T)+く(gく)(y)+く(yくgI   ' Jlnlnlnln)ln( 43221504
                            (2) 
where refjtD   denotes the liberalization-related policy change occurred at the beginning of 
each observational window and measured as the difference between the level of financial 
liberalization index at time t+j and the level at time t+j-1. 
For robustness check, we also estimate models (1)-(2) where inequality is 
expressed as the average net income inequality index over 5-year rolling windows, i.e. 




3. Data and Empirical Results 
We use annual data and an unbalanced panel of 62 countries over the period 1973-
2005.2 Net income Gini inequality index data comes from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID). Per capita GDP and degree of openness are taken from the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank and the Penn World Table (PWT) 
Version 7.0, respectively. Finally, data on financial reforms is based on the works of Abiad 
and Mody (2005) and Abiad et al. (2010). In particular, we consider the aggregate index of 
financial reform, which measures the removal of government control and direction of the 
financial sector. In addition, we also look at nine dimensions of financial reforms, such as 
credit controls, (aggregate) credit ceilings, directed credit/reserve requirements, interest 
rate controls, security markets, privatization, international capital flows, entry barriers/pro-
competition measures and banking supervision. Thereby, model (2) is estimated for each 
dimension of financial liberalization. 
Tables 1 summarizes the results for the baseline models (1)-(2), while estimates 
reported in Table 2 and 3 refer to model specifications where the net income Gini 
inequality index is computed as either the average over 5-year rolling windows or 
expressed in levels, respectively. 
In column (1), we present the evidence for the baseline model (i.e. without accounting for 
the effects of financial reforms); Column (2) adds the aggregate index of financial reform 
to the set of explanatory variables; and, in Columns (3)-(11), we look at different 
typologies of financial reforms. The empirical evidence shows that financial reforms 
promote a more equal distribution of income. In fact, the coefficient associated with the 
financial reform index is negative and statistically significant. 
Moreover, the results suggest that directed credit and removal of excessively high 
reserve requirements are especially important in reducing income inequality: the sign of 
the coefficient associated with this type of financial reform is always negative and 
statistically significant (-0.017, -0.007 and -0.008 in Tables 1, 2 and 3, respectively). This 
result corroborates the findings of the political economy literature, which emphasizes that 
access to credit reduces inequality (Haber and Perotti, 2007; Benmelech and Moskowitz, 
2010; Rajan and Ramcharan, 2011). It is also similar in spirit to the finding of Agnello and 
                                                          
2
 Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Morocco, 
Mexico, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, UK, USA, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
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Sousa (2012a), who show that a better access to credit from the banking sector promotes 
income equalization. Similarly, easiness of expansion of bank branches, wider banking 
services and lower regulation in more democratic societies can increase access to credit 
and, thereby, contribute to a fall in inequality.  In contrast, the existence of a minimum 
amount of bank lending to cHUWDLQ ³SULRULW\´ VHFWRUV LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI targeted policies 
designed to help development is detrimental to the income inequality gap. Moreover, when 
reserve requirements are excessive ± for instance, because legislation forces banks to 
deposit a large share of financial savings with the central bank - it is likely that inequality 
will rise. In this respect, it corroborates the work of Demetriades and Luintel (1996), who 
highlight that, in poor countries, frictions encountered by small businesses in their 
activities and high barriers to entry are very frequent. 
We also find that reforms in the securities market contribute to a more even income 
distribution. Tables 1, 2 and 3 all show that this financial reform has a negative effect on 
the net income Gini inequality index (with the coefficients being -0.023, -0.011 and -
0.012, respectively). Therefore, policies that promote the securities markets (such as the 
development of depository and settlement systems, the openness of securities markets to 
foreign investors or tax incentives) help narrowing the income inequality gap. This finding 
JLYHV ULVH WR WKH LGHD WKDW ILQDQFLDO FRQVWUDLQWV FDQ EH VHHQ DV D ³VSHFLDO ODUJH EDUULHU´
(Claessens and Perotti, 2007). Putting it differently, a proper functioning of the credit and 
equity markets should guarantee equal opportunities for both the less wealthy and the more 
talented individuals and, consequently, financial reforms should help the diffusion of 
economic opportunities and reduce inequality. 
In line with the work of Barro (2008), the results support the existence of the 
Kuznets curve, i.e., an inverse U-shape curve between income inequality and per capita 
GDP: the coefficient associated with per capita GDP is statistically significant and has a 
positive sign, while per capita GDP squared has a negative sign. 
Additionally, the government size can be thought as a buffer against disparities in 
the distribution of income. In fact, the coefficient associated with this variable is negative 
and statistically significant, thereby suggesting that governments can play a major role in 
reducing inequality. In contrast, trade openness seems to exacerbate income inequality as 
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in Barro (2008), because the expansion of traded goods sector due to greater openness of a 






This paper shows that financial reforms reduce income inequality. We find that 
financial reforms, in general, and removal of subsidized directed credit and excessively 
high reserve requirements and improvements in the securities market policy help promote 
a more equal distribution of income. 
We also show that: (i) there is a nonlinear relationship between per capita income 
and income inequality (the VR FDOOHG ³.X]QHWV´ FXUYH LL WKH VL]H RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW 
helps reduce the income inequality gap; but (iii) trade leads to more disparity in the 
distribution of income.  
From a policy perspective, the research presented in this paper casts some concerns 
about the impact of some recent (unconventional) policies adopted in several industrialized 
countries - such as, quantitative easing - on inequality. In fact, by helping governments 
finance their budget deficits, reallocating wealth towards banks and negatively impacting 
on the return of pension funds (which typically invest more on government bonds and are, 
consequently, more vulnerable to the decline in long-term yields), economic policies can 
DIIHFW WKH FRPSRVLWLRQRIKRXVHKROGV¶SRUWIROLR 3RWHUED DQG6amwick, 1995, 2003) and 
may amplify income inequality. 
While assessing the impact of financial reforms on income inequality, this paper 
opens new avenues of investigation. It is possible to have a bi-directional relationship 
between financial development and economic growth (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996). In 
addition, Abiad and Mody (2005) VKRZ WKDW GLVFUHWH HYHQW RU ³VKRFNV´ ³OHDUQLQJ´ DQG
structural features (such as the legal system or the political institutions) can be important 
drivers of financial reforms. This raises a question as to whether inequality can foster the 
likelihood of financial reforms. Inequality may create pressures and incentives in a society 
towards a change of the policy regime. On the other hand, it may prevent a genuine 
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 Although the evolution of inequality could be influenced by many factors aside from openness, it is worth 
mentioning that previous research provides conflicting theoretical explanations for the effects of trade 
openness on income inequality and the empirical evidence is also inconclusive. 
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financial reform, because incumbents either block it or reap the benefits of the change 
(Claessens and Perotti, 2007). We leave these open questions for future research. 
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